When a refrigeration plant burns: Why Fairfield matters in New Zealand
A fatal fire and explosion at an Ohio food plant triggered a precautionary ammonia shelter-in-place. For New Zealand’s HVAC&R sector, it’s a sobering reminder of the risks behind industrial refrigeration.
In mid-February, a fire and reported explosion tore through the Koch Foods processing facility in Fairfield, Ohio. One worker died, two others were injured, and authorities issued a precautionary shelter-in-place across a two-mile (3.2km) radius because of the potential for an anhydrous ammonia release from the site’s refrigeration system. Air monitoring reportedly detected no off-site ammonia and the order was later lifted. The cause of the incident remains under investigation and US federal workplace safety authorities have opened an inquiry.
For New Zealand’s HVAC&R community, this is not just an overseas tragedy. It is a stark reminder of the risks behind many of our most efficient, climate-aligned industrial refrigeration systems.
An uncomfortable truth
New Zealand has rightly leaned into natural refrigerants. Ammonia delivers performance, energy efficiency and negligible direct global warming potential. It underpins our export food economy where industrial refrigeration is critical.
But ammonia is also toxic. Under the wrong concentration, it can be life-threatening. Under certain conditions, it is flammable. And in a large processing plant, it is stored and circulated in quantities that demand rigorous process safety discipline. When fire enters that equation, complexity multiplies.
In Fairfield, reports indicate that firefighters faced heavy fire conditions and structural compromise, forcing a defensive strategy and a worker who had been unaccounted for was later recovered from the building. Authorities issued the shelter-in-place not because a large ammonia plume had been confirmed off-site, but because the potential existed if refrigeration equipment or pipework were compromised. That decision, based on credible worst-case thinking, is precisely what good risk management looks like.
It should also prompt some questions here at home, such as…
Could we isolate our plant if we couldn’t enter it?
Every ammonia-refrigerated facility in Aotearoa should pause at that question.
In a major fire, access routes to engine rooms may be cut off, roof collapse can sever pipe bridges and cable trays, power may be lost or unstable, and fire crews may be unable to enter to manually close valves.
Layered controls matter such as: automatic shutdown; clearly identified, remotely accessible isolation points; gas detection that continues
to function in degraded conditions; emergency power resilience where it is genuinely required; and up-to-date valve maps that Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) can understand at any time of day or night.
These are not compliance niceties, they can be life-safety systems.
Is FENZ ready for your plant?
In Fairfield, emergency managers moved quickly to establish a precautionary perimeter., suggesting prior awareness of the ammonia inventory and the potential consequences of a large release.
How many New Zealand facilities can say with confidence that:
- FENZ has conducted a pre-incident visit?
- Local crews know where the engine room is?
- They understand what the gas detection alarms mean?
- They know which valves isolate high-pressure receivers versus low-pressure vessels?
- They have discussed shelter-in-place versus evacuation triggers for neighbouring properties?
Under the Health and Safety at Work Act and the Major Hazard Facilities regime (where applicable), primary duties sit with the PCBU. But in practical terms, community safety will hinge on how well refrigeration engineers, plant operators and emergency services understand each other before something goes wrong.
Fire and refrigeration
Our sector spends significant time on energy optimisation, leak reduction, decarbonisation pathways and training apprentices. All of that is essential.
Less frequently discussed, at least outside specialist process safety circles, is the interface between building fire design, structural fire resistance, penetrations and pipe supports, electrical services resilience, and refrigeration system integrity.
When an industrial building burns hot enough to compromise roof structure, suspended pipework and condensers are suddenly at risk. When power distribution boards are damaged, control logic disappears. When access is lost, manual intervention is no longer an option.
The Fairfield investigation will determine the ignition source and sequence of events. But for us, the deeper issue is systemic: have we engineered our ammonia plants assuming that fire will eventually test them?
An export nation with high-consequence risk
New Zealand’s economy is unusually dependent on large, ammonia-refrigerated processing sites. Many are close to communities, with some near schools, residential zones or transport corridors that did not exist when the plant was first commissioned.
Urban encroachment is real, and community expectations are rising.
A precautionary shelter-in-place order in a provincial US city quickly becomes national news. The same would be true here.
The HVAC&R profession must be able to demonstrate, to regulators, to neighbours and to the public, that:
- Our systems are designed to recognised standards;
- Our emergency planning is rehearsed, not theoretical;
- Our maintenance regimes are robust and documented; and that
- Our incident reporting culture is mature and transparent.
More than avoiding prosecution, it’s about protecting the standing of natural refrigerants at a time when they are central to decarbonisation.




